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Abstract 
When accessing traditional knowledge, life scientists often violate the customary 
non-disclosure rules of indigenous communities. This article investigates how 
indigenous groups can prevent an unwanted access of their knowledge. It therefore 
compares biodiversity politics in Brazil and India. Brazilian indigenous 
movements effectively defend regulations to deny the disclosure of their 
knowledge, whereas the Adivasis in India have not achieved any statutory 
recognition of their customs. To explain these differences, the article draws on 
social movement theory. It shows that this approach has the potential to both 
explain the success chances and to carve out the constraints on indigenous political 
agency in environmental politics. 
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1 Introduction 
In many countries of the Global South, indigenous communities live in close interaction 
with their natural environment. Through centuries of experience, they have acquainted 
themselves with substantial knowledge of local plants and animals which are used both 
for food and nourishment as well as for medicinal and religious purposes. Increasingly, 
‘traditional knowledge’ (TK) has attracted the attention of life scientists, because they 
can use it as a starting point for inventions for which they subsequently seek intellectual 
property (e.g., patents) protection1.  
In the view of many lawmakers and environmental groups, the commercial 
exchange between life scientists and indigenous communities creates a triple-win 
situation by which economic and scientific interests can be combined with the sustainable 
use of biological resources. They presuppose that indigenous groups are willing to share 
their knowledge if they receive a fair compensation. Indigenous groups, however, are not 
always willing to disclose their experiences, even they are if financially remunerated. 
While not completely rejecting the ‘commodification’2 of TK, their customary rules often 
prescribe a narrowly limited or at least conditional disclosure. The ignorance of these 
customs destroys the identities of the affected groups and contributes to the outbreak of 
violent contestations3. That is why indigenous activists and human right lawyers demand 
institutional safeguards to ensure that the access to TK is made conditional on the “prior 
informed consent” (PIC) of indigenous communities. In other words, they claim for “the 
right to say no” to the unwanted use of their knowledge4.   
While the literature has anecdotally shown that the legal implementation of PIC 
provisions crucially depends on indigenous political agency5, little is known about the 
dynamics in this policy field. In order to fill this gap, the article draws on the insights of 
social movement theory. Based on this literature, it can be expected that the success of 
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indigenous political actors to defend their customary rules depends on their framing 
strategies, their ability to form alliances, and their access to political institutions6. In this 
article, social movement theory is not only used to explain the achievements of 
indigenous political agency. At the same time, it also serves as a diapositive to carve out 
its limitating factors. By that, it sheds light on the necessary success conditions for 
indigenous political agency, at least in environmental policies.  
Empirically, the article focuses on traditional knowledge policies in Brazil and 
India. In both countries, indigenous groups claim for the legal recognition of their 
customary rules of conditional disclosure. However, only Brazilian regulations draw (at 
least legally) on the principle of PIC, whereas the Indian indigenous population 
(Adivasis) cannot rely on any statutory instrument to protect themselves against the 
unwanted access to their knowledge7. The differences are all the more puzzling in view 
of the fact that the relative proportion of Adivasis in the Indian society (8.2%8) is far 
higher than that of Índios in Brazil (0.2%9). 
This article is structured as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the norm 
conflicts between indigenous communities and external actors, the international legal 
framework, and the regulations in Brazil and India. The second section (2) justifies the 
case selection and shows why social movement theory might provide a heuristic to 
explore the success chances of indigenous political agency. While section 3 describes 
indigenous strategies in Brazil, section 4 deals with the political dynamics in India. 
Section 5 compares both cases with regard to the potentials and constraints of indigenous 
political agency in this field. The article concludes with a few remarks on the more 
general shortcomings of the chosen approach to identify possible future research 
directions. 
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1 Is there a right to say no? 
The livelihood of many indigenous communities10  is predominantly shaped by the use 
of their surrounding biological resources. While partially integrated into a money-based 
economy, local animals and plants form the basis for nutrition and medicinal treatment, 
but they are also used for cultural practices and religious ceremonies. During the course 
of century-old experiences, indigenous groups have acquired tremendous knowledge on 
their natural habitat11.  
Within the communities, the use of biological resources and the hereto-related TK 
are regulated by very complex customary property rules, which differentiate between 
access, ownership, usufruct, and disposition rights12. Quite often, these rules are 
intrinsically linked to religious beliefs and cultural practices, which constitute the 
collective identity of particular groups13. Against this background, TK is often kept 
secret, because it is considered to be sacred and inalienable14. In other cases, the 
disclosure is made conditional upon specific qualifications, e.g. the waiver of any 
commercial exploitation15. Irrespective of its cultural relevance, indigenous groups 
associate their customary property rules on TK as part and parcel of their self-
determination rights16.  
For external actors, these limitations are hardly comprehensible because they are 
at odds with their own worldviews and interests17. From the perspective of life scientists, 
indigenous practices are a rich source of information about potential active ingredients 
for pharmaceuticals and agronomic improvements, but the socio-cultural context 
conditions are perceived as negligible or at least subordinated to the overarching goal of 
scientific progress18. When neglecting customary non-disclosure rules, scientists 
frequently defend themselves by the non-egalitarian distribution of TK within the 
communities, the ‘backwardness’ of their cultures, and the potential use of their resources 
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for ‘mankind at large’19. But even if they admit that indigenous communities should be 
remunerated for the disclosure of their knowledge, they ignore that financial 
compensations in an only partially money-based exchange system are likely to trigger 
distributional conflicts and often lead to a loss of the groups’ social identities20.  
 International regulations on the access to TK are highly ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Art. 26.2) explicitly recognises 
the right of indigenous groups ‘to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
re-sources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use’21. International trade law, on the other hand, does not contain any 
restrictions on the use of TK. Quite to the contrary, indigenous knowledge itself remains 
outside the definitional scope of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS). This indirectly supports its unremunerated use as a basis for further 
(industrial) research, most notably in industrialised countries22. To a certain extent, 
international environmental law takes a middle ground. While encouraging the 
commercial exploitation of TK for the sake of a sustainable use of biological resources, 
the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the hereto-related Nagoya Protocol stipulate 
that indigenous and traditional communities must be consulted on the access to their 
resources23.  
Against the background of intrinsically inconsistent international norms, legal 
scholars strongly recommend the establishment of “collision rules” in order to reconcile 
the recognition of indigenous customary rules with the legal system of state24. They argue 
that the principle of indigenous ‘prior informed consent’ (PIC), if legally enforced, may 
serve as a bridge ‘between customary laws and positive law at legislative, judicial and 
administrative levels’25. PIC thus facilitates a voluntary exchange of resources, but also 
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acknowledges that indigenous communities maintain the right not to disclose their 
knowledge to outsiders26.   
As of yet, however, industrialised countries have fiercely resisted any amendment 
of international law which might facilitate the recognition of PIC in commercial 
transactions27. Most user countries, including the EU and the U.S., deny any meaningful 
extraterritorial obligation to ensure the compliance of their life science companies with 
indigenous rights in the provider states, e.g. by an amendment of the TRIPS agreement28. 
That’s why the establishment of collision regimes ultimately depends on the willingness 
of the domestic governments in the Southern periphery. In the developing world, the 
implementation of the international ‘regime complex’29 has stipulated a broad range of 
diverging national regulations. With regard to indigenous communities’ rights to deny 
the disclosure of TK, Brazil and India are located at the extreme points of a continuum 
between legal recognition (Brazil) and neglect (India).  
Brazilian laws explicitly make PIC prerequisite for any economic exploitation of 
TK. Until recently, any access had been subjected to a rigorous authorization procedure 
which focused on ensuring the indigenous communities’ consent to the economic 
exploitation of their resources30. In many instances, indigenous groups have made use of 
their non-disclosure rights to deny the unwanted access to their knowledge31. To curb 
bureaucracy, ongoing legal changes direct towards an ex-post verification of indigenous 
consent, but the requirement of PIC will remain. Moreover, indigenous communities are 
legally entitled to participate at the formulation of procedural mechanisms to ensure the 
abidance of PIC requirements, and the accordance of intellectual property titles for 
inventions remains dependent on the evidenced access approval of the (indigenous) TK 
holders32.  
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Although Brazilian regulations are frequently suffering from (mainly 
extraterritorial) enforcement problems33, governmental authorities have shown times and 
again that they can effectively sanction at least their domestic industries if they 
circumvent legal requirements34. Most notably, the public prosecution department 
consider PIC as an essential principle ‘to bridge (…) indigenous law and the law of the 
surrounding society, holding together the overall legal system in a sufficiently flexible 
and effective manner’35.   
In India, on the other hand, a collision regime between indigenous customary law 
and the legal system of the state is virtually absent. Both the National Biodiversity Act 
(2002) and the Biodiversity Rules36 only request the consent of governmental authorities 
as prerequisite for any access to TK. The local biodiversity boards, which are assumed to 
represent the interests of the Adivasi (and other local communities), only have a 
consultative status37. While the Indian Patent Amendment Act (2005) makes it mandatory 
to notify the patent authority about the use of TK in patent applications, there is no legal 
provision which would make it imperative to prove the PIC of the knowledge holders. 
Quite to the contrary, critical observers hint to the incoherence between India’s 
internationally strong stance against ‘biopiracy’ and its domestic neglect for the interests 
of the affected communities38. The recently issued new ‘National Intellectual Property 
Rights Policy’ does not indicate any change in this regard39.  
Under these conditions, the recognition of PIC eventually depends on the 
benevolence of individual researchers. Some projects voluntarily respect indigenous 
customs, but many projects do not entail any PIC procedures at all40. Even if indigenous 
groups receive a financial remuneration for sharing their knowledge, they are frequently 
negatively affected by unintended long-term consequences. Once they have disclosed 
their knowledge on particular species, other actors (local middle-men, police forces) often 
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try to block their access to the relevant biological resources in order to reap the profits for 
themselves41. By this, the lack of legally recognized PIC procedures contributes to the 
ongoing violent contestations in the Indian tribal belt42. 
2 Explaining indigenous political agency 
The differences between the Brazilian and the Indian approach appear quite astonishing, 
given that both cases are characterised by roughly comparable context conditions. In both 
countries, indigenous groups claim for a legal recognition of PIC. Their demands fall in 
line with the interests of other local communities. On the other hand, indigenous claims 
both in Brazil and in India meet opposition from public and private research institutions. 
Despite the predominant need for growth and technological leapfrogging in emerging 
economies, both countries are democratic political systems in which ethnic minorities and 
their cultural identities enjoy constitutional protection. 
So how can we explain that Brazilian indigenous communities’ claims have been 
far more successful than those of their counterparts in India? Anecdotal evidence from 
various countries suggests that at least the initiation of a debate on PIC depends on the 
self-initiative of indigenous actors43. However, the literature on environmental 
governance seems ill-equipped to conceptualise indigenous political agency in this field, 
because its analytical (and partially normative) focus on top-down perspectives tends to 
eclipse indigenous opposition to the globally prevailing managerialist assumptions. Most 
notably in the more practical writings of this literature, indigenous actors remain the 
‘natural but often forgotten partners’44. The ethnological literature, on the other hand, 
offers a very detailed understanding of the value systems of indigenous communities, but 
the emphasis on the distinctiveness of individual groups makes these writings hardly 
suitable for the understanding of collective action on a larger scale45.  
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For this reason, this article draws on the insights of social movement theory to 
assess the conditions for effective indigenous political agency in this field. Social 
movement theory has already been applied in the in the Latin American context to 
understand indigenous human rights and constitutional policies46. Departing from the 
basic insights of this approach, it can be assumed that the success of indigenous political 
agency depends on three basic conditions.  
Firstly, it seems essential that indigenous groups are able to find a wording that 
represents their viewpoint and is acceptable to a broader audience47. Thus, their capacity 
to frame their priorities in a way that corresponds to the (both nationally and 
internationally) prevailing discourse enables them to gather support from other parties 
and bridge socio-cultural differences48. Secondly, indigenous groups should be able to 
build alliances. Cooperating with different allies may broaden the target audience due to 
complementary fields of attention49. Although transnational networks or ‘advocacy 
coalitions’ may be particularly helpful in this regard50, it is of crucial importance that 
social movements can rely on a solid social network at the domestic level as well51. 
Thirdly, it is assumed that indigenous groups will be more successful if they can make 
use of established institutional points of entry into the political system52. The success of 
such strategies will be enhanced if indigenous groups can also access the international 
arena. The ‘boomerang effect’ may also mean that they can harness the pressure of 
international organisations against their domestic government, at least if these have 
officially committed themselves to protecting their indigenous population53.  
The basic assumptions of social movement theory will be used as a heuristic tool 
to analyse TK politics in Brazil and India. Their application serves as a means to both 
understand the mechanisms of successful indigenous political agency and to carve out the 
constraints on political activism. Empirical evidence for this article has been obtained by 
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document-based process tracing and 136 interviews with indigenous activists, public 
officials, and representatives from research institutions, corporations, and non-
governmental organisations in Geneva, Berlin, Brussels, Brazil, and India between 2009 
and 2016. The selection of the interviewees was based on document-tracing (official 
minutes, reports, newspaper articles, weblogs, etc.) and recommendations from previous 
interlocutors. While most of the interviews were structured by a questionnaire with open 
questions, the sequence and focus of each conversation was adapted to the individual 
interlocutors’ fields of expertise and interest. The confidentiality of all interview partners 
is ensured by not revealing their names or any other information that may endanger their 
anonymity.  
3 The battle for PIC in Brazil 
At least for the time being, Brazilian indigenous groups have effectively defended the 
right to deny the access to their knowledge. They have succeeded in developing a 
comprehensive policy frame, which has facilitated the establishment of an alliance with 
other societal actors which cannot be completely ignored in the political arena. The 
following section gives an overview on Brazilian indigenous political agency in a fiercely 
contested policy field. 
Since the late 1970s, Brazilian indigenous leaders have adapted the political 
strategies of other marginalised groups (e.g. rubber-tappers) and used the 
environmentalist discourse to defend their customary practices54. Their framing strategy 
was given an extra impetus by the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which hosted 
an ‘earth parliament’ of indigenous peoples55. Brazilian indigenous movements perceived 
the debate on environmentalism as an opportunity to present their subsistence-based 
lifestyle as a sustainable alternative to the predatory exploitation of nature.   
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At the same time, their representatives connected environmental arguments with 
the more far-reaching claims for indigenous cultural self-determination. During the 
Brazilian transition to democracy in the 1980s, they succeeded in framing the abolishment 
of assimilationist policies as an integral part of the country’s democratisation process56. 
Certainly, their contribution to the democratic transition has helped indigenous groups to 
make their agenda acceptable to a broader public57. However, more than twenty years 
after Brazilian democratisation, this argument is losing some of its appeal. It is for this 
reason that indigenous actors are currently emphasising the genuine link between human 
rights and environmental issues in order to defend their claims for the legal recognition 
of their customary rules58. They present their community-based livelihoods as an 
alternative to the capitalist system of exploiting men and nature59.  
The broad and comprehensive policy frame has enabled indigenous 
representatives to cooperate with a range of other groups such as Quilombolas 
(descendants of the former African slaves), rubber-tappers, Ribeirinhos (riparian 
communities in the Amazon), and the influential Landless Movement60. Despite slightly 
diverging priorities, all these groups agree on the need to protect subsistence lifestyles 
throughout the country61. Together, they are able to exert substantial political pressure, 
which has manifested itself in impressive demonstrations and marches both in the capital 
and in rural areas62. Even the conservative media in Brazil cannot afford to ignore their 
protests, which means that their claims are brought to the attention of the whole Brazilian 
society. 
The ‘environmentalisation of social conflicts’63 also resonates with the 
perceptions of many Brazilian middle-class citizens, because the indigenous emphasis on 
the sustainable use of natural resources corresponds with their critical attitude towards 
neoliberalism and the conservative establishment of large landowners.  Although the view 
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of indigenous groups as the ‘guardians of nature’ may be an oversimplification64, 
indigenous representatives can draw on these perceptions in order to win support. 
Actually, the overlap between the interests of Brazilian environmental middle-class 
NGOs and indigenous groups is real with regard to their resistance to the deforestation of 
the Amazon basin and the excessive expansion of industrial agriculture65. That is why 
indigenous movements and civil society actors can build up a mutually beneficial alliance 
against the agribusiness, which is denounced as a Trojan horse of global capitalism.66 
The influence of this network is reinforced by a close cooperation with like-
minded groups throughout South America. Transnationally maintained websites and 
regular meetings make it possible for indigenous representatives and their non-indigenous 
allies to keep themselves in-formed about politically relevant developments in their 
region. Transnational contacts enable indigenous actors to track the political strategies of 
multinational agricultural and pharmaceutical companies in other countries. This often 
permits them to pre-empt their political moves in Brazil.67 Moreover, indigenous groups 
and their allies get acquainted with the internationally prevailing buzzwords, which is of 
help for their discussions with politicians and public officials.68 
Given their broad network, indigenous activists have been able to select their 
partners carefully. They are well aware that their interests with regard to their customary 
practices over-lap only partially with the interests of the ‘the white men’.69 Most notably, 
they remain critical of transnational environmental NGOs, whose representatives 
sometimes attempt to delegitimise indigenous speakers if they feel that their goals may 
conflict with conservationist priorities.70 Keeping a careful watch on the activities and 
initiatives of transnational NGO and international organisations has not prevented 
indigenous groups from cooperating with them on a selective basis71, but they remain 
vigilant to prevent any misappropriation of their claims.  
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The broad interconnectedness of indigenous groups makes it imperative for 
Brazilian lawmakers to at least consider their claims.72 While Índios have only rarely 
been represented directly in the legislative chambers of Brazil's Congress73, they have 
been able to win the sympathy of many left-wing deputies, involving both legislative 
activities and extra-parliamentary opposition.74 75  Marina Silva is maybe the most 
prominent example. The former senator, environment minister, and presidential candidate 
is an iconic figure of the rubber-tapper movement of the 1970s and 1980s, whose support 
for indigenous claims still carries tremendous political weight in Brazilian public 
discourse76. Apart from this prominent figure, indigenous groups can also make use of 
the contacts of other traditional communities with the senators of their federal states.77 
Within the executive branch at least on the central level, Brazil's decision-making 
structures are characterised by a comparably high degree of openness to indigenous actors 
and their allies. For a long time, the Ministério do Meio Ambiente (Ministry of 
Environment, MMA), which takes a lead in TK policies, was well-known for its very 
participatory culture78. Although the ministry has partially aligned its priorities with those 
of the Brazilian life sciences industries, indigenous groups and their supporters within the 
Brazilian civil society make successfully use of various forms of informal influence and 
open protest in order to prevent the ministry from ignoring indigenous concerns.79 This 
strategy is reinforced by the assistance of the public prosecution department80, whose 
officials pride themselves in their ‘judicial activism’ on behalf of indigenous and other 
minorities.81 Together with the Indigenous Authority and the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministério Publico forcefully defends the PIC requirement against the encroachment of 
other ministries and government bodies, which tend to act as proponents of the 
pharmaceutical and agro-industrial research sectors82. However, the support of these 
departments strongly depends on continuous lobbying efforts and a powerful self-
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representation of the indigenous groups, which constantly remind decision-makers that a 
neglect of their interests will spur massive protests.83 
What is perhaps even more important is the fact that indigenous representatives 
have succeeded in becoming involved in international debates on TK84. They frequently 
participate in the deliberations of the World Intellectual Property Organisation and they 
are strongly engaged in discussions in the context of the Convention on Biodiversity and 
the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.85 Indigenous activities on the 
international debate serve primarily defensive purposes. Their representatives effectively 
prevent the Brazilian government from committing itself to international agreements 
which are against indigenous interests, but they are not able to put up sufficient pressure 
for an internationally binding instrument to ensure the PIC principle on a global scale.86 
At least, however, the presence and visibility of indigenous actors in the multinational 
forums increases the responsiveness of Brazilian authorities on the domestic level, 
because they attempt to avoid international reputational damages.87   
All in all, the successful framing and alliance-building strategies of indigenous 
actors have ensured an institutional responsiveness which makes it possible for them to 
fend off the more far-reaching demands of the life science industry to facilitate the access 
to TK against their will. Their success, however, cannot be taken for granted and crucially 
depends on a continuously vigilant involvement with the ongoing debates. 
4 Failed consent in India 
Within the Indian context, the framing strategies of Adivasi representatives are suffering 
from several inconsistencies, which both aggravate their difficulties to form alliances and 
serve as a pretext for governmental authoritarianism. This section gives an overview on 
the largely unsuccessful political agency of indigenous groups to ensure a legal 
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recognition of their right to deny the access to TK. 
As in Brazil, indigenous groups in India connect their political claims on TK to 
an environment-friendly and sustainable lifestyle. They refer to their traditional ethical 
principles which demand for harmonious relationships between human beings and their 
natural surroundings.88 Nevertheless, it is rather difficult for Adivasi representatives to 
credibly defend their customary property rules by the sustainable use of environmental 
resources. Although their subsistence economy is generally based on sustainable 
practices, this does not preclude the occasional clearing of wooded areas or the killing of 
marauding elephants89. Against this back-ground, the Adivasis’ defence of their 
customary rules as being environmentally sound practices is often met with considerable 
scepticism both among traditional Hindus and urban environmentalist groups. Even 
scientifically trained biologists warn against ‘romanticising’ indigenous environmental 
practices.90 
Maybe even more problematic appears the second pillar of the Adivasi frame, 
which puts great emphasis on political self-determination. Against the historical 
background of the curtailment of their autonomy under colonial rule, many Adivasi 
communities associate the freedom to decide about the access to their resources with a 
general mistrust against the (Indian) state and its authorities.91 While the general lack of 
self-regulatory competencies is criticised by the majority, the various Adivasi groups and 
their spokespersons strongly disagree on desirable extent of political autonomy. Most 
activists would be completely satisfied with a formally guaranteed right to customary 
self-governance, including the right to decide autonomously and by traditional procedures 
about the access to natural resources and TK92. However, some Adivasi leaders formulate 
more far-reaching demands, which are often entangled (or can at least be associated) with 
secessionist positions.93 
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The differing interpretations of self-governance have serious consequences. 
Firstly, the insistence on customary governance brings Adivasi groups into conflict with 
other local communities. Although the latter may share the interest in the possibility to 
withhold their TK, they are afraid that particular forms of indigenous customary 
governance (e.g., hereditary rules) could ultimately restrict their own access to natural 
resources.94 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the mere associability of self-
governance with secessionism serves as a pretext for the Indian government to prevent 
human rights NGO from supporting Adivasi groups in political terms. 
As many Adivasi claims (e.g., with regard to land rights) interfere with the 
developmental goals of Indian authorities, human rights NGOs in India are subject to 
significant restrictions and rigorous surveillance as soon as they support indigenous actors 
in political terms.95 At best they can provide clandestine practical support, which is 
however hardly useful for a broader public debate.96 The only potentially powerful ally 
would be the comparably strong communist parties and their networks. However, the 
insistence of Adivasi representatives on their traditional customs is at odds with the 
prevailing modernisation ideology of Marxist intellectuals and leftist activists97. Even if 
they oppose the political suppression of indigenous actors, they do not necessarily 
subscribe to the defence of culturally and religiously rooted customs.98 
Under these circumstances, Adivasi representatives often build alliances with 
transnational preservationist organisations (e.g., IUCN, Greenpeace) which have an 
interest exploring the Indian biodiversity to prevent its extinction.99 However, this 
cooperation comes at a price. At least implicitly, most transnational NGO representatives 
remain sceptical about PIC, because they are afraid that this principle might also 
compromise their own access to indigenous resources.100 That is why they put particular 
emphasis on the synergistic effects between environmental and developmental goals 
17 
 
which might be attained by an increased use of TK.101 While this argumentation helps 
Adivasi communities to claim financial remunerations for the disclosure of their 
knowledge, it directly contravenes the idea that indigenous groups should decide by 
themselves whether to share it with outsiders.  
Given the distorted representation of Adivasi interests, a meaningful discussion 
about a collision regime between customary rules and the Indian legal system hardly takes 
place in the political arena. Even if Adivasis are directly involved with the law-making 
processes, hereto-related proposals remain scarce and are quickly swept under the rug. 
While one might assume that Adivasis could benefit from India's electoral quota for 
scheduled tribes and castes, the details of India's electoral law make it impossible for them 
to defend their specific interests. According to Indian regulations, all candidates have to 
finance costly electoral campaigns independently102, which means that they depend upon 
the financial support of the Indian elites.103 As a result, most of the elected Adivasis 
belong to a ‘creamy layer’ which is quite detached from the realities of the local 
communities104. 
But even if elected Adivasi representatives try to defend the interests of local 
communities, they face serious constraints in the legislature. Given that even comparably 
progressive parties’ officials are usually critical against indigenous identity concerns105, 
it is often impossible for Adivasi lawmakers to represent the interests of their 
communities against the preferences of the party elites. Quite to the contrary, a tough 
stance on Adivasi issues negatively affects their standing within the party hierarchy. Thus, 
in the view of many indigenous law-makers, a substantial representation of Adivasi 
interests against the predominant ideology in the legislative chambers appears futile at 
best and self-destructive at worst.106 
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Within the executive branch, the debate on TK is virtually monopolised by the 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) within the Ministry of Commerce 
& Industry.107 The DIPP maintains a very close and opaque relationship with industrial 
federations and lawyers associations108, but it shows no interest in the input of indigenous 
actors.109 Instead, it has attempted to control flows of information to prevent other 
departments from gaining a foothold in the debate.110 However, it remains questionable 
whether indigenous movements could benefit from the involvement of other 
governmental bodies. During the debate on various legislative proposals, the Indian 
Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MOEF) has demonstrated a similar attitude to 
the DIPP with regard to indigenous voices111.  
Within the Indian bureaucracy, indigenous voices are routinely dismissed as 
naïve, backward, and ignorant.112 A former representative of the powerful Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) brings it to the point: Adivasis ‘need to be 
educated, because the whole world could benefit from their knowledge’.113 From this 
perspective, the introduction of a PIC requirement appears undesirable, as Indian 
researchers and decision makers are too afraid of the ‘non-cooperative nature of [the] 
tribal population’ which might endanger the access to their knowledge114.  
For the same reasons, the Indian government is eager to prevent Adivasis from 
appealing to international organisations. When international meetings (e.g. the 
conferences of the Convention on Biodiversity) take place on Indian soil, security forces 
ensure that critical voices remain behind the fences.115 The few Adivasis who are allowed 
to participate at international meetings are carefully selected and controlled by the 
authorities. Allegedly, Indian authorities deny passports to indigenous activists if they 
can be anticipated to report critically about Indian politics during their stay abroad.116 The 
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result is that they cannot bring about the international pressure that might force the Indian 
government to let them participate in the debate on TK policies.  
All in all, it seems fair to say that the failure of indigenous political agency in 
India can mainly be attributed to a complex interaction of legal and societal restrictions. 
Having said this, the framing and alliance-building strategies of indigenous actors do not 
appear helpful to overcome these obstacles. Against this background, the implementation 
of legal instruments to protect customary non-disclosure rules seems highly improbable, 
at least in the foreseeable future.  
5 Success conditions and constraints on indigenous political agency 
By and large, the case studies on TK policies in Brazil and India have confirmed 
the insight of scholars in legal pluralism that it would be misplaced to understand 
indigenous communities as mere norm recipients of domestic and international law117. 
Quite to the contrary, it could be shown that indigenous actors engage with the legal 
system in a creative way and attempt to bring contradictory demands in line in their own 
values and interests. To understand these processes of ‘juridification from below’118, it 
seems that social movement theory provides a useful heuristic tool for an analysis of the 
underlying dynamics.  
The empirical evidence presented in this article has largely confirmed the basic 
assumptions of this literature. In the Brazilian case, indigenous groups have developed a 
consistent and widely accepted policy frame, which has enabled them to form close 
alliances with other societal actors. Due to its political weight, this coalition has 
succeeded in accessing the political system, which has in turn shown a considerable 
degree of responsiveness to its demands. Moreover, the access to international 
organisations helps indigenous activists to put pressure on the Brazilian government 
which in turn reinforces their recognition at least on the domestic level. 
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To be sure, the relative success of Brazilian indigenous representatives cannot be 
exclusively attributed to their political agency. Historical coincidences such as the Earth 
Summit in 1992 and the country’s democratic transition as well as the favourable attitude 
within parts of the Brazilian middle-class and among left-wing decision-makers have 
facilitated their achievements. At the same time, the volatility of the political opportunity 
structures continuously endangers the sustainability of their accomplishments. However, 
it seems fair to say that indigenous actors have seized the opportunities to use them in 
their own favour.  
The Indian case study, on the other hand, illustrates that the success chances of 
indigenous political agency may be significantly diminished by adversarial context 
conditions. While roughly deploying the same strategies as their Brazilian counterparts, 
Adivasi representatives have so far failed to bring about any substantial success. Their 
failure can be mainly explained by structural constraints. To begin with a practical issue, 
their occasional allegedly anti-environmental behaviour may be unavoidable but prevents 
them from constructing a broadly acceptable image of ‘ecological savages’. Although 
there are no serious reasons to consider their lifestyles to be generally less ‘sustainable’ 
than those of the Brazilian Índios, occasional deviations, even if vitally necessary, 
effectively compromise the credibility of this policy frame. A similar constraint affects 
the Adivasi representatives’ emphasis on political self-determination: While most of their 
claims do not go beyond the demands of Brazilian indigenous representatives, the mere 
associability of their wording with secessionism provokes a fierce repudiation within a 
society which perceives the country’s territorial integrity to be endangered by latently 
hostile neighbour states.  
Under these conditions, the formation of alliances becomes a challenging task and 
entails political compromises which ultimately contravene the original goals of 
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indigenous actors. The lack of a meaningful (self-) representation at least reinforces the 
paternalistic attitude both of possible allies and within the political arena, which in turn 
decreases the likelihood of a responsive behaviour from the side of decision-makers. In 
the end, the interplay between unfavourable political opportunity structures and failing 
political agency ends up in vicious cycle. The structural neglect of indigenous actors’ 
claims leads to a degradation of indigenous living conditions which makes it even less 
possible to develop a viable strategy of political agency which in turn leads to a further 
deterioration of political and practical opportunity structures. Even well-intentioned 
forms of political co-optation (e.g., quota systems) seem unable to break up these negative 
feedback loops because they only contribute to the alienation between an elite of 
assimilated Adivasis and the political movements on the ground.  
Finally, both case studies illustrate that the effectiveness of indigenous political 
agency finds significant limitations in the multi-level structure of an increasingly 
internationalised political opportunity structure. First of all, the Indian case shows that 
the engagement beyond the borders of the nation state can be severely compromised if it 
is impeded by governmental authorities. This holds particularly true if the political goals 
of indigenous actors are not fully in line with the interests of the prevailing transnational 
civil society organisations. But even if indigenous representatives are not (or less) 
confronted with these obstacles, they hardly have the possibility to challenge the 
competing interests of industrialised countries, which however would be necessary to 
overcome the ambiguities of the international legal frame-work.  
Concluding remarks 
All in all, the application of social movement theory to traditional knowledge politics in 
Brazil and India has illustrated that this literature offers a useful heuristic tool to explain 
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the success chances and to carve out limitations of indigenous political agency in this 
field. Having said this, it seems that this perspective is less suited to capture the 
underlying systemic framework conditions. 
Diverging historical colonial legacies119, for example, might help to explain why 
indigenous actors in Brazil have less difficulty with developing policy frames which are 
appealing for other marginalised actors and at least acceptable in the broader societal dis-
course. The confusion on the implications of indigenous self-governance among the 
Adivasis themselves, on the other hand, could be related to the divide-and-conquer 
strategy of the British colonial rulers in the past centuries. Obviously, the combination of 
social movement theory and postcolonial perspectives would be challenging because it 
would require the mutual adaptation of two very different literatures, but it might be a 
fruitful exercise to develop an in-depth understanding of environmental conflicts.  
A second enrichment would require the literature to connect indigenous political 
agency more systematically to the insights of critical political ecology. In an increasingly 
globalised world, local contestations are shaped by transnational and international 
political processes. Empirically, social movement scholars already make use of this 
insight to explain the dialectics of human rights law120. The more critical literature could 
broaden the view to the extent that it puts more emphasis on structural power imbalances 
and their impact on trans- and international dynamics.  
In sum, postcolonial and international political economy perspectives might add 
a historical and economic dimension to the analysis of marginalised actors’ norm 
contestations and power struggles, which ultimately are at the core of the social 
movement literature. 
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